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Abstract
We compare the performance in employment, wages and productivity for domestic
plants acquired by new domestic and foreign owners. Prospective foreign owners pick
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ductivity decline in domestic acquisition targets before acquisitions, only wages recover
afterwards. Employment, wages and labour productivity increase after foreign acquisi-
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1 Introduction
The increase in foreign direct investment in industrialised countries since the mid-1980s has
largely come about through mergers and acquisitions (M&As). At the same time the volume of
mergers and acquisitions among firms of the same nationality has also increased. An acquisition
of another plant offers the new owner the possibility to restructure current operations in such a
way that plant performance changes permanently. The new owner may want to change the size
and composition of the labour force or employment conditions. The new owner may also bring
in new capital, technology or management practises. The literature on mergers and acquisitions
suggests different motives for ownership changes; these in turn give rise to different predictions
about the effects of an ownership change on the performance of the acquisition target. The
possible restructuring following an ownership change may enhance productivity and allow the
plant to expand. However, there is no guarantee that a restructuring process always turns out
to be successful.
In this paper we investigate the performance of plants around an ownership change, in par-
ticular we compare domestic plants that are acquired by a foreign owner to domestic plants that
are acquired by a new domestic owner. We look at plant performance in terms of employment,
wages and productivity. We show that plants subject to these two types of ownership change
differ both before the acquisition and in their post-acquisition performance. Acquisitions may
occur close to plant entry or exit and plants may experience more than one ownership change
close in time. To take account of these possibly confounding events, we further demonstrate
how selecting the sample of plants that experience acquisitions affect our conclusions about
the performance in acquired plants relative to a reference group. To examine these questions
we use the census of Norwegian manufacturing plants from 1992 to 2004, where we observe on
average 167 domestic and 45 foreign acquisitions per year.
Our paper is related to the empirical literature on post-acquisition performance. For exam-
ple Lichtenberg and Siegel (1987), Maksimovic and Phillips (2001), Schoar (2002) and Maksi-
movic et al. (2008) all examine the effect of acquisitions on productivity using data from the
US. They find that productivity measured as labour productivity or total factor productivity
increases in the period after the ownership change. Lichtenberg and Siegel (1987) also find that
plants with below industry-average productivity are more likely to change ownership. Gugler
and Yurtoglu (2004) and the literature summarised therein look at the impact of mergers and
acquisitions on employment; these studies find mostly no effect or a negative effect on employ-
ment after acquisitions. The literature on the impact of acquisitions on wages as summarised
in Conyon et al. (2004) provides examples of both positive and negative effects.
While the studies mentioned above do not separately address foreign acquisitions, another
strand of the literature deals specifically with the effects of foreign acquisitions on the perfor-
mance of the acquired plants. The motivation in these papers is to establish whether plants
acquired by foreign owners are ‘cherry-picked’ on pre-acquisition performance and/or whether
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performance improves with the new foreign owner. The evidence is mainly consistent with
foreign owners targeting high productivity firms as well as positive post-acquisition effects on
productivity. Examples are McGuckin and Nguyen (1995) for the US, Harris and Robinson
(2002), Girma and Go¨rg (2007b) and Criscuolo and Martin (forthc.) for the UK, and Karpaty
(2007) for Sweden. Regarding other effects of foreign acquisitions, most of the evidence sug-
gests that employment is unchanged or increases after foreign acquisition, examples are Girma
(2005) for the UK and Bandick and Karpaty (2007) for Sweden. Wage increases after foreign
acquisitions are documented by Conyon et al. (2002) and Girma and Go¨rg (2007a) for the UK
as well as Huttunen (2007) for Sweden.
Only a few papers compare domestic and foreign acquisitions; Conyon et al. (2002) and
Hanley and Zervos (2007) do this for the UK, Gioia and Thomsen (2004) for Denmark; Fukao
et al. (2006) and Bertrand and Zitouna (2008) study domestic and foreign acquisitions in Japan
and France, respectively. While the performance measures used vary between these studies,
the general picture is that performance improves by more after foreign acquisitions than after
domestic acquisitions. One exception is Hanley and Zervos (2007) who find a dip in post-
acquisition labour productivity for UK plants acquired by both domestic and foreign firms, but
only plants acquired by domestic owners also show a dip in wages after acquisition. In terms of
the selection of acquisition targets, most of these studies find that foreign owners acquire firms
that perform better before acquisition than the ones domestic buyers choose. Exceptions are
Conyon et al. (2002) who find that foreign owners target firms with below average productivity
in the UK. Also Gioia and Thomsen (2004) find that foreign buyers have a propensity to acquire
lower performing but bigger targets compared to Danish domestic firms.
While most papers in the literature focus on only one measure of plant performance around
acquisitions, we compare plant performance in terms of employment, wages, labour productivity
and total factor productivity. A further contribution is that we take account of entry and
exit and multiple ownership changes in order to isolate the performance around ownership
change from what happens around these competing events. From empirical evidence on plant
heterogeneity,1 we know that plant entry and exit are events where plant performance is known
to differ, not only from industry average, but also from their own within-plant average in terms
of employment and productivity. As ownership changes may in some cases occur shortly after
entry, or may be followed by subsequent plant closure or yet another ownership change, it is
important to isolate the performance around ownership changes from developments close to
competing events like entry, exit or other ownership changes.
Finally, we look at plant performance for a longer period before acquisition than is usually
done in the literature. While it is common to follow plants for some time after the acquisitions
based on the argument that the effects of acquisitions may take time to materialise, it could
also be the case that a plant’s performance prior to acquisition is the trigger for a change in
ownership. For instance, Lichtenberg and Siegel (1987) argue that poor plant performance is
1For a survey see Bartelsman and Doms (2000).
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a signal that the owner does not have a comparative advantage in managing the plant and
should therefore sell it on to a new owner. This suggests that in order to fully understand
plant performance around ownership change it is not enough to just look at the development
in performance after acquisition, the period before acquisition has to be taken into account
as well. While most of the above literature reduces the pre-acquisition period to the year
before acquisition, we study the performance of acquisition targets starting 3 years before the
acquisition. The requirements that allow us to follow an acquisition target from 3 years before
until 3 years after the acquisition while the plant is not at the same time close to entry, exit
or additional acquisitions, clearly limit the number of acquisition targets that can be used in
the analysis. We add to the literature by carefully documenting how different restrictions on
the sample of plants that undergo ownership changes introduce selection bias in the results
regarding plant performance around acquisition.
Our findings from Norwegian manufacturing suggest that acquisition targets of domestic and
foreign owners differ in terms of size, average wages and labour productivity already 3 years
before the ownership change. Future foreign acquisition targets perform well above the average
of domestic plants that are not acquired, while plants that are to undergo a change between
domestic owners only differ in terms of being larger in size. During the 3 years leading up to an
ownership change, performance in targets of new domestic owners deteriorate markedly, while
there is little evidence of a similar deterioration in performance before foreign acquisitions. In
the 3 years after domestic acquisitions employment returns to previous levels, but there are no
strong signs of improvements in productivity. In contrast, the post-acquisition performance of
plants subject to foreign acquisition improves in terms of employment, wages and productivity.
Restrictions on the sample of acquisitions, such as choosing surviving plants and the exclusion
of competing events, introduces an upward bias for foreign acquisitions and a downward bias
for domestic acquisitions.
In the following, Section 2 provides a short background on theories of mergers and acquisi-
tions and relates them to the existing empirical evidence. In Section 3 we introduce the data
set and provide definitions of the events of entry, exit and acquisitions. Section 4 first doc-
uments plant performance around entry, exit and acquisitions relative to industry-year mean
and relative to within-plant averages (4.1). Then we concentrate on acquisitions and discuss
the effects of sample selection and study the change in performance both in the 3 year period
prior to ownership change and the 3 year period after acquisition (4.2). Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical and Empirical Background
In the theoretical literature several motivations for mergers and acquisitions have been put
forward. The different motivations for M&As may have different implications for how plants
are expected to perform both before and after the acquisition. We briefly discuss 3 general
hypotheses of motivations for M&As.
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a) Managerial hybris: Managers may use mergers and acquisitions to fulfill their desire to
maximize firm size (e.g. Jensen, 1986) or to build empires (e.g. Baumol, 1959 and Mueller,
1969). If efficiency considerations are of secondary order in such decisions, no clear predictions
can be made as to whether the target firms are more likely to be ‘lemons’ or ‘cherries’ before
the acquisition. Furthermore, plant performance after acquisition may not change, and could
even deteriorate if managerial hybris is not coupled with managerial competence.
b) Management’s comparative advantage: According to the neoclassical theory of the firm,
firms’ boundaries shift across industries in response to shocks that alter their and their competi-
tors’ comparative advantage (Lucas, 1978, Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001). Here a firm deploys
its talent and organisation in industries where it can obtain the greatest marginal payoff. These
payoffs are affected by industry shocks which may lead firms to adjust their boundaries in ac-
cordance with their comparative advantage by selling or acquiring plants. Hence, acquisitions
are a way to improve the match between plants and the comparative advantage of firms (Licht-
enberg and Siegel, 1987). This stretches to cases where an acquiring firm expects to improve
efficiency by disciplining (or replacing) management. Consequently, if plants are not sold again
shortly after a takeover, the acquisition was in line with the comparative advantage of the ac-
quirer and performance should increase after acquisition (Maksimivic et al., 2008), in particular
productivity and profitability.
Lichtenberg and Siegel (1987) interpret their evidence from acquisitions in the US as sup-
porting this view, both in terms of the finding that the acquisition targets in their sample are
‘lemons’ and the observed improvement in productivity after acquisition. Shleifer and Summers
(1988) argue similarly that mergers and acquisitions offer an opportunity for a new management
team to renegotiate or revoke existing contracts as they may be less committed to upholding
past agreements with stakeholders. Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) investigate this hypothesis
and find that employment is reduced by more after acquisitions in Europe than in the US.
They argue that the more rigid labour market regulations in Europe create a greater need for
revoking contracts with workers there than in the US where it is easier to reduce employment
after negative shocks. Conyon et al. (2002) also argue that their finding of a significant wage
decrease after domestic acquisitions in the UK is consistent with the Shleifer and Summers
argument.
c) Synergy effects: This view argues that acquiring firms are looking to buy targets that
have related efficiencies such that synergies between the firms can improve efficiency further.
McGuckin and Nguyen (1995) argue that their finding for the US, where high productivity
plants are acquired and improved further, is consistent with this view.
The hypotheses mentioned above do not explicitly distinguish between domestic and cross-
border M&As. While the nationality of the new owner does not have to play a role, cross-
border acquisitions are different from domestic acquisitions in that they are - like greenfield
investments - a way of entering a new geographical market. Already Dunning’s (1981) OLI
paradigm stipulates that a multinational enterprise has to have a specific ownership advantage
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in order to overcome the lack of information and extra costs associated with investing in a
foreign country. It is indeed well established that subsidiaries of foreign-owned firms outperform
their host-country competitors in terms of size, technology intensity, management performance
and productivity (Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004). Therefore, if superior management
or technological skills are transferred to the foreign subsidiary upon acquisition this should
enhance performance, especially productivity. This is in line with the comparative advantage
argument above in that here firms exploit their capabilities beyond national borders.
Technology sourcing or gaining access to other types of foreign knowledge, has been brought
forward as an alternative motivation for firms to invest abroad (Keller (2004) provides a survey).
This would suggest that foreign owners target high-productivity plants in acquisitions and
performance after acquisition is not affected by the new owner.2
Nocke and Yeaple (2007) exploit essentially the above two arguments when considering the
implications for post-acquisition performance of domestic versus foreign acquisition as part of
their analysis of the relationship between firm efficiency and the mode of foreign market access.
According to their model acquisition targets of domestic and foreign acquisitions do not differ
in industries with internationally mobile capabilities (e.g. technological know-how), but the
foreign acquirers are on average more efficient and hence the improvement in post-acquisition
establishment performance should be higher. In contrast, in industries where the source of firm
heterogeneity is not internationally mobile (e.g. market expertise, advertising) the targets of
domestic acquisitions are endowed with a better non-mobile capability and this is where their
better post-acquisition performance derives from.
3 Data and definitions
3.1 Data sources
Our main data source is the annual census of all Norwegian manufacturing plants collected by
Statistics Norway. The Norwegian Manufacturing Statistics are collected at the plant level, and
include detailed information on production, input use, location, and industry classification.3 As
we want to construct measures of total factor productivity we cannot work with plants that
have only limited information on capital, i.e. plants classified as ‘small’. Consequently, we
drop plants that have less than 10 employees all the years they are observed. For the period of
analysis, 1992-2004, this procedure drops about two thirds of the plants and about half of the
observations in the full census, but the remaining plants still account for almost 90% of total
manufacturing employment during this period. We further drop plants that never invest in
capital equipment, plants that have missing observations for one or more of the relevant input
2Criscuolo and Martin (forthc.) explore the relative importance of the two motivations empirically for the
UK.
3For more detailed descriptions of the Manufacturing Statistics, see the documentation in Halvorsen et al.
(1991) and Møen (2004).
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or output variables (employment, wage costs, capital and gross output) in 50% or more of their
years in the panel. This procedure drops about 4% of observations between 1992-2004; it has
only minor effects on average plant size, industry composition and the share of foreign-owned
plants in the panel.4 The resulting panel contains 65740 observations from 7158 plants.
In order to classify plants as foreign or domestic, we use the register of foreign ownership
interests collected by Statistics Norway, the so-called SIFON register. The register can be linked
to plants in the Manufacturing Statistics. We classify plants as foreign-owned when either direct
or indirect foreign ownership of equity is above the 50% threshold.5 A foreign-owned plant is
by definition part of a foreign multinational (MNE).
We are also able to identify domestic MNEs in manufacturing by using a third source of
data; the register of outgoing foreign direct investment (FDI) from Norway. The register of
outward FDI contains, among other things, information on shares and votes in operations
abroad controlled by Norwegian firms. We define a Norwegian MNE as a firm that is not itself
majority owned from abroad, while it has direct or indirect ownership shares of more than 50%
in operations abroad.
3.2 Definitions of events
Although the performance of plants around ownership change is our primary interest, we think
it is important to isolate what happens to performance around acquisitions from what happens
close to entry and exit. Empirical evidence has shown that plant performance close to entry
and exit deviate from average; entering plants are small, and if successful increase employment
substantially in the first years after entry, while failing plants that are about to close down
typically have low productivity and shed labour in the last years before exit, see Bartelsman
and Doms (2000) for a survey of the evidence. This is particularly important for our data set
since it is a census that is dominated by small plants and large turnover of plants. The nature
of our data allows us to identify entry, exit and ownership changes for each plant.
In the Norwegian Manufacturing Statistics each plant is assigned an identification number
which it keeps throughout its life. A plant keeps its previous identification number even when
it re-enters the market after a time of inactivity as long as production restarts in the same
geographic location. Ownership changes at the firm level do not affect the plant identification
code. Since our data are from a census, we avoid the problem of possible false entries and exits
due to plants not being sampled.
Although the logic of the census would imply that a plant is not in operation if it is not
observed for some time, we assume that when a plant is missing from the census for one or two
consecutive years, this is due to lack of registration/reporting rather than a temporary closure.
4The average domestic plant in our sample has 41 employees, while the average foreign owned plants has 97
employees.
5A firm has direct foreign ownership interests if foreigners own part of the equity of the firm. If 50% or more
of equity in a plant is owned by another firm based in Norway (mother), and the mother is foreign-owned, this
is defined as indirect foreign ownership in the SIFON-register.
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When a plant disappears for three or more consecutive years before it reappears in the census,
we regard it as (temporarily) closed and count an extra exit and entry for that plant. Thus, we
define a plant as an entrant in year t if it appears for the first time in year t, or reappears in
the year after a temporary closure. Similarly we define an exit in year t if the plant is present
in year t and temporarily closed in t+ 1, t+ 2 and t+ 3, or absent all subsequent years.6
In terms of ownership changes, we identify a foreign takeover of a domestic plant by a change
in the foreign ownership of assets. We define a foreign acquisition in year t if the share of assets
owned by foreigners increases from below 50% in year t− 1 to above 50% in year t. We define
a plant as undergoing a domestic acquisition in year t if it is domestic both in t and t− 1, but
has a new firm identification code in year t. Thus, in this paper we are looking at ownership
changes of plants that are domestically owned before the ownership change.7
Table 1: Numbers of plants by ownership and type of event
1992 1996 2000 2004 1992-2004
mean sd.
Domestic plants 5276 4774 4472 3871 4588 422
of which
- Domestic survivors 4493 4262 3978 3545 4109 355
- Domestic acquisitions 251 201 155 106 167 59
- Domestic entry 121 154 112 51 115 39
- Domestic exit 411 157 227 169 197 70
Foreign plants 346 420 541 560 469 90
of which
- Foreign survivors 284 337 430 514 392 79
- Foreign acquisitions 29 52 73 24 45 17
- Foreign entry 6 14 14 5 11 4
- Foreign exit 27 17 24 17 21 7
Table 1 gives an overview of the composition of domestic and foreign plants in our sample
by type of event in 4 selected years. The last two columns give the mean and the standard
deviation of the annual numbers of plants for the whole period. On average during the period
from 1992-2004 there are 45 foreign acquisitions per year and 167 domestic acquisitions. In line
with many other developed countries, the total number of manufacturing plants declined over
the period and the number of foreign-owned manufacturing plants has increased, primarily due
to acquisitions. The total share of employment accounted for by foreign firms increased from
12% in 1992 to 25% in 2004.8 It is important to note that in Norway there are no institutional
incentives in place to attract FDI.
6Less than 2% of the plants in our final sample are subject to temporary closures.
7We briefly discuss the role of ownership changes where the plant is foreign owned before ownership change
in Section 4.2.
8In Swedish manufacturing the share of employment in foreign-owned firms increased from 17% in 1993 to
38% in 2002 according to Bandick and Karpaty (2007), and Huttunen (2007) documents an increase from 5%
to 22% in the same period for Finnish manufacturing.
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4 Performance around domestic and foreign acquisitions
4.1 Controlling for entry and exit in the full sample
We examine performance in the years around an ownership change by regressing measures of
plant performance, yi,t, on the following:
yi,t =
t+2∑
t=t−2
αDtDom acqi,t +
t+2∑
t=t−2
αFtFor acqi,t
+
t+2∑
t=t
βDtDom entryi,t +
t+2∑
t=t
βFtFor entryi,t
+
t∑
t=t−2
γDtDom exiti,t +
t∑
t=t−2
γFtFor exiti,t + Controls + ²i,t.
(1)
Dom acqi,t (For acqi,t) is a dummy variable equal to 1 in the year of domestic (foreign)
acquisition, we also include separate dummies for the two years before, and the two years after
the acquisition. To isolate the effect of the acquisitions from entry and exit, we also include
separate entry (exit) dummies for plants in the first (last) year they are observed and the two
following (preceding) years. We refer to the full set of entry, exit and acquisition dummies
as event dummies. As controls we include plant size (log employment), plant age, and two
dummy variables: domMNEi,t if a plant is part of a domestic MNE, and forMNEi,t if a plant
is part of a foreign MNE. These dummies are set to zero when any of the event dummies are
equal to one. This ensures that the control group contains only domestic non-MNEs.9 We also
include industry, year and industry-year interaction dummies. The industry dummies are at
the 4-digit ISIC level, corresponding to 78 industries, while the industry-year interactions are
at the 3-digit level with 28 manufacturing industries.
Our plant-level performance measures yi,t are employment (in log terms), the average wage
in the plant (in log terms), labour productivity (LP) defined as the log of deflated gross output
per employee and total factor productivity (TFP). We calculate the log of TFP from the
following equation
lnTFPit = lnYit − αˆK lnKit − αˆM lnMit − αˆL lnLit, (2)
where Yit is deflated gross output, Kit is deflated capital, Mit is deflated material use, and Lit is
the number of employees in plant i in period t.10 αˆK , αˆM , αˆL are the estimated coefficients from
an OLS a regression where the log of output is regressed on the log of the three inputs, year
and industry dummies and industry-year interactions. In this way, the TFP measure takes out
any systematic differences in input use between sectors, across years, and also removes industry
9We discuss the role of Norwegian multinationals in domestic and foreign acquisitions in Section 4.2.
10See the Appendix for details on the definitions and construction of all variables.
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trends. Our results are robust to using other measures of TFP (cf. Section 4.2).
We estimate equation (1) using both OLS and plant fixed effects. Given that we include
industry, year, and industry-year interaction dummies, the OLS coefficients on the event in-
dicators will capture the deviation from the reference group that represents the industry-year
averages of domestic non-MNEs that are not experiencing an event. With our fixed effects
estimations, we examine whether plants that are close to events deviate from their own average
performance over their time in the panel. The interpretation of the fixed effects coefficients is
then that a negative (positive) coefficient on an event dummy suggests that the plant is doing
worse (better) than ‘usual’ (their own average over time) that year.
We present the OLS results in the first four columns of Table 2 and the fixed effect re-
sults in columns 5-8. The dummies for domestic and foreign MNEs indicate as expected that
subsidiaries of multinational firms are much larger, pay higher average wages, and have higher
labour productivity than non-MNEs. The OLS results show that foreign entrants outperform
the reference group already at start-up, while this is not the case for domestic entrants. And,
while domestic exits perform well below average at the time of exit, foreign plants that are
about to close down still have wage levels almost 10% above average and productivity levels
that do not differ significantly from the reference group. The fixed effects results show similar
patterns of within plant deviations for foreign and domestic entrants and exits. Both types
of entrants (exis) have a start-up (shut-down) size about half that of their own long-term av-
erage. Entrants quickly increase employment after entry; and exits decrease employment and
productivity in the years leading up to exit. However, while domestic plants close to exit clearly
reduce average wages, foreign exits do not.11
Turning to plants that experience ownership changes, the OLS results tell us that plants
experiencing a change of domestic owner are around 30% larger than average two years before
the acquisition, do not differ from average in terms of wages and labour productivity, and have
TFP levels significantly below average before the acquisition. The fixed effects results for em-
ployment in column 5 of Table 2 show positive coefficients on the domestic acquisition dummies
before the ownership change and negative and significant coefficients after. This suggests that
employment decreases from before to after domestic acquisitions. The results for wages and
productivity in columns 6-8 also confirm that domestic takeovers seem to occur primarily in
troubled plants. Judging by the negative and significant coefficients on the acquisition dum-
mies in years t − 1 and t, wages and productivity fall before domestic acquisitions. After the
ownership change TFP reverts back to normal, labour productivity is still below own average
2 years after the acquisition, and average wages increase.
Plants that are subject to foreign acquisitions are larger (70-80%), pay higher wages (8%)
and have higher labour productivity (15%) than the reference group already two years before
11The reduction in average wages relative to previous levels in domestic plants prior to exit is likely to be
a combination of a curb in nominal wage increases such that the real wage is reduced, a reduction in hours
worked and use of overtime, and a change in the composition of the workforce. Schwerdt (2008) finds that the
high-skilled workers are the first to leave in ‘the shadow of plant death’.
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the acquisition. These deviations from average persist in all the years around the acquisition,
while TFP levels do not differ significantly from those of the reference group until 2 years after
foreign acquisitions, when they are significantly higher (columns 1-4). The fixed effect results
show that contrary to what happens in plants subject to domestic acquisitions, employment
and labour productivity is higher after foreign acquisitions than before. Similar to domestic
acquisitions, average wages in the acquired plants are higher after ownership change, but the
effect is stronger in the foreign acquisitions.12
4.2 Sample selection
The results in Table 2 are based on using all the observations of domestic and foreign ownership
changes in our sample. Some of these plants are close to an acquisition and entry or exit at
the same time, or they experience several ownership changes within a few years. As we have
seen in Section 4.1, plants that are close to entry and exit differ markedly in performance from
more established plants. Therefore, also the performance of plants that are sold to new owners
could differ substantially depending on whether or not the new owners close down the plant
or sell it on to new owners shortly after the acquisition.13 For the results in Table 2 to reflect
the average performance in acquisition targets relative to the reference group, the underlying
assumption is that the effects of multiple events are separable.
To avoid this separability assumption, we drop all observations that have entry (t to t+ 2)
or exit (t−2 to t) dummies equal to one in Table 2. This affects more than 11000 observations,
and reduces the numbers of domestic and foreign ownership changes by around 12% each.
By concentrating on plants that are in operation at least 3 years before the acquisition and
survive at least 3 years after the acquisition we select plants based on survival. The purpose
of this section is to discuss how the results on the performance of plants around acquisitions
are affected by different selection criteria for the group of plants that undergo acquisitions. In
addition to the survival sample just mentioned (Sample 1), we also use 3 more restrictive samples
of acquisition plants. We make sure that our reference group is the same across samples and
consists only of non-MNEs at least 3 years from entry and exit.14 This simplifies the estimating
equation (1) to:
12Although we do not have information on the skill composition of the workforce, the increase in average
wages is likely to be a result of a change in the composition of the workforce towards high-skilled workers, which
is also reflected in the increased labour productivity. Bandick and Karpaty (2007) suggest that the positive
effect of foreign acquisitions is more immediate for high-skilled employees than for low-skilled employees.
13Maksimovic et al., (2008) show that plant exit is common following a change in ownership in their US data.
In our sample 5(6)% of plants exit within 2 years of a domestic (foreign) acquisition.
14We do this by dropping plants that do not experience any ownership changes, but have MNE status at
some point. This makes the domestic and foreign MNE dummies used in equation 1 redundant. We also drop
observations of our acquisition plants when they are more than 3 years away from ownership change to make
sure that observations of plants subject to ownership change are never in our control group of non-MNEs.
12
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ln yi,t =
t+3∑
t=t−3
αDtDom acqi,t +
t+3∑
t=t−3
αFtFor acqi,t + Controls + ²i,t. (3)
Table 3 shows that we have almost 2400 acquisitions of domestic plants by either new
domestic or foreign owners in Sample 1. In Samples 2-4 we address the following concerns:
First, plants may experience multiple acquisitions. Second, ownership change may also occur
in plants that are foreign owned before the change of foreign ownership (foreign divestures or
change from one foreign owner to another).15 Third, while a foreign acquisition by definition
involves a foreign MNE, what role do domestic MNEs play in acquisitions?
In Sample 2 we take account of the issues above by excluding plants with more than one
ownership change during our 13 year sample period. In our data, plants with multiple acquisi-
tions are on average more than twice as large as plants with only one acquisition. In addition,
multiple acquisitions make the definitions of periods before and after acquisition difficult. Drop-
ping plants with more than one acquisition turns out to remove most of the observations in
Sample 1 where plants are foreign-owned before an ownership change.16 Focusing on plants
with only one ownership change also drops most of the observations where plants are classified
as domestic MNEs, and we also drop the remaining 118 (41) plants with domestic (foreign)
acquisition that are domestic MNEs at some point. Thus with Sample 2 we compare how
performance evolves in non-MNEs that are acquired either by foreign owners (145 plants) or
by different domestic owners that are not MNEs (1016 plants).
In Samples 1 and 2 we have not worried about missing observations of plants around ac-
quisitions, or about observing each plant both before and after the acquisition. We address
this in Sample 3, where we restrict Sample 2 further by requiring that the plants with only one
acquisition are observed in years t− 3, t− 2, t+2, and t+3 around the acquisition year. This
removes plants with missing observations around acquisition, excludes acquisitions occurring
before 1995 and after 2001, and makes the selection on survival more stringent.17
Both, Samples 2 and 3 compare non-MNEs that are acquired either by foreign owners (that
are MNEs by definition) or by new domestic owners that are not MNEs, but it could be argued
that it is more relevant to compare foreign acquisitions of domestic plants to acquisitions of
domestic plants by domestic MNEs. This is what we capture in Sample 4. From the plants
15Most of the research on foreign acquisitions looks at foreign acquisitions of domestic plants and ignores
ownership changes from foreign to domestic. One exception is Sjøholm and Lipsey (2006) who compare domestic-
foreign and foreign-domestic takeovers in Indonesia; they do not obtain clear-cut results for foreign to domestic
takeovers.
16These types of acquisitions are not counted in Table 3, but for the plants in Sample 1 there are 313 ownership
changes where plants are foreign-owned before the ownership change. Only 21 of these observations remain after
dropping plants with multiple ownership changes, this indicates that most of the foreign divestures occur in
plants with multiple ownership changes. Most of these are plants where the foreign ownership share changes
back and forth around the 50% threshold.
17Given that for Sample 1 we already dropped observations that are within 2 years of entry and exit, the
requirement in Sample 3 implies that the acquisition plants enter at least 5 years before acquisition and exit no
closer than 5 years after acquisition.
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Table 3: Numbers of acquisitions in different samples
Domestic Foreign
Sample 1 All acquisitions not close to entry/exit 1894 492
Sample 2 Plants with 1 acq. and never a domestic MNE 1016 145
Sample 3 As Sample 2, and observed 2/3 years before/after acq. 417 57
Sample 4 Plants with 1 acq. and acq. by domestic and foreign MNEs 18 74
with only one acquisition we select plants with acquisitions occurring between 1995 and 2001
where the plant is always a non-MNE before the acquisition and the new owner is either a
Norwegian MNE (18) or a foreign MNE (74).18
We estimate equation (3) by OLS on the 4 samples of plants that experience acquisitions.
Our performance measures yi,t are as before; employment, wages, labour productivity and TFP.
Results are presented in Table 5 in the Appendix, and the estimated coefficients for Samples 1-3
are depicted graphically in Figure 1.19 A glance at Figure 1 is consistent with the main message
from using the full sample in Table 2. Domestic plants experiencing foreign acquisitions are
larger, pay higher wages and have higher labour productivity than both the reference group
and plants subject to domestic acquisitions, already 3 years before the takeover. Plants subject
to domestic acquisitions are also significantly larger than the reference group 3 years before the
acquisition, but this is not the case for wages and productivity.
The general picture from our TFP results in Figure 1 and Table 5 in the Appendix is that
plants subject to foreign acquisitions do not have TFP levels that differ significantly from those
of the reference group, while the plants subject to domestic acquisitions tend to have lower levels
of TFP (lemons) than the reference group in some of the years around acquisition. The TFP
results are robust to a number of different specifications of TFP. First, based on estimating TFP
according to equation 2; we have imposed constant returns to scale, experimented with different
capital measures, and replaced the number of employees with total hours worked in the plant.20
Second, while still calculating TFP according to equation 2, instead of using estimated input
coefficients from a regression of output on inputs, we take as our input coefficients average factor
cost shares at the 3-digit industry-year level. Third, production function estimation has been
shown to yield poor results when important unobservables that vary both across plants and
over time, such as productivity shocks, are omitted. Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) propose using
intermediate inputs rather than investment to address the underlying simultaneity problem.
Using the residuals obtained from the Levinsohn-Petrin approach at 2-digit level give results
in line with the general pattern reported for TFP.21
18For the foreign acquisitions this sample is between Sample 2 and Sample 3. In order to get more than 10
domestic MNE acquisitions we did not impose the additional restriction of Sample 3 that we can observe the
plants in the years t− 3, t− 2, t+2, and t+3 around the acquisition (the restriction on missing observations).
19We return to Sample 4 in Figure 2.
20The variable definitions in the Appendix contain details on the alternative capital and labour input measures.
21Results for different TFP measures can be obtained from the authors on request.
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Figure 1: Employment, wages and productivity around acquisitions in year t relative to
industry-year mean
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Notes: Graphical representation of regression results for Samples 1-3 in Table 5.
Sample 1 (solid line) includes all acquisitions not close to entry/exit. Sample 2
(dashed line) includes all plants with 1 one acquisition that are never domestic
MNEs. Sample 3 (dotted line) as Sample 2 and plant is observed 2/3 years be-
fore/after acquisition. Reference line at zero represents industry-year mean. Dots
indicate significance at 10% or better. 15
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Overall, the results show a marked difference in pre-acquisition performance between plants
that are targets of foreign and domestic acquisitions. New foreign owners pick better plants than
new domestic owners do, and this ordering is not affected by the different selection criteria used
in Samples 1-3. The results are consistent with the evidence in Hanley and Zervos (2007), Fukao
et al. (2006) and Bertrand and Zitouna (2008) for the UK, Japan and France, respectively.
The evidence is also in line with the ‘cherry-picking’ evidence for foreign acquisitions provided
for several other countries.22
While the graphs in Figure 1 show broadly similar trends, our different ways of selecting
plants do affect the size of the coefficient estimates. As our first sample implies a selection on
survival from at least 3 years before the acquisition until at least 3 years after the acquisition,
it is reasonable to expect that the results based on Sample 1 will show us that plants subject to
acquisition are larger and more productive relative to the reference group than when using the
full sample. Comparing the coefficients on the acquisition dummies in columns 1-4 of Table 2
with the results for Sample 1 in Table 5 (columns 1 and 5) in the Appendix confirms this. The
largest positive effects of selection on survival are firm size and labour productivity of plants
subject to domestic acquisitions.
For plants subject to domestic acquisitions, the main difference between Sample 1 and Sam-
ple 2 is that we take out plants that at some point are domestic MNEs and hence are relatively
large and productive. This has the expected effect of lowering size, wages and productivity rel-
ative to industry-year means, such that the dashed line representing Sample 2 in Figure 1 lies
below the solid line of Sample 1. The main difference between Samples 1 and 2 for the plants
subject to foreign acquisitions is that we take out foreign acquisitions of domestic MNEs and
plants with multiple acquisitions due to the foreign ownership share varying around 50%. This
also reduces the size of the plants subject to foreign acquisitions relative to the reference group
(the dashed line is below the solid line in Figure 1), increases labour productivity, whereas
wages and TFP are more or less the same relative to the reference group in Samples 1 and
2. The additional selection on even longer survival in Sample 3 (the dotted lines in Figure 1)
lifts the size of both foreign and domestic acquisitions closer to the results for Sample 1. For
wages and labour productivity, the bias introduced by this selection goes in opposite directions
for plants subject to domestic and foreign acquisition: it increases the coefficients for plants
subject to foreign acquisitions relative to the reference group and biases wages downward for
domestic acquisitions such that they are significantly below those of the reference group until
2 years after the domestic ownership change.
The trends in the graphs appear robust to the different sample selections. For foreign
acquisitions the graphs are upward sloping for employment, wages and labour productivity. In
comparison to the reference group, plants subject to domestic acquisitions show reductions in
employment and productivity, but not for wages, around acquisitions. These diverging patterns
22See for example Criscuolo and Martin (2009), Karpaty (2007) and Huttunen (2007) for evidence from the
UK, Sweden and Finland, respectively.
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for foreign and domestic acquisitions are in line with the evidence in the full sample presented
in Table 2.
Table 4: Employment, wage and productivity growth from before to after acquisitions relative
to domestic plants in Sample 3
Employment Avg. wage Lab. Prod. TFP
Before to after acquisition [(((t+ 3) + (t+ 2))− ((t− 2) + (t− 3)))/2]
dom acq -.007 (.021) .024 (.010)∗ -.024 (.019) -.018 (.009)∗
for acq .080 (.047)(∗) .038 (.021)(∗) .066 (.061) -.010 (.018)
R2 .22 .21 .22 .31
N/Plants 12503/2529
Before acquisition [((t+ 3) + (t+ 2))/2− t]
dom acq -.059 (.021)∗∗ -.018 (.018) -.043 (.022)∗ -.024 (.011)∗
for acq -.008 (.050) .020 (.039) -.027 (.053) -.036 (.029)
R2 .13 .14 .13 .26
N/Plants 13687/2628
After acquisition [t− (((t− 2) + (t− 3))/2)]
dom acq .065 (.020)∗∗ .028 (.013)∗ .005 (.020) -.009 (.009)
for acq .097 (.056)(∗) .064 (.021)∗∗ .117 (.059)∗ .009 (.020)
R2 .13 .32 .22 .38
N/Plants 13323/2602
Notes: OLS regressions where the dependent variables are the change in perfor-
mance over the time periods specified. The ‘before to after acquisition’ and the
‘before acquisition’ regressions include controls for the levels of plant age, size
and the level of the dependent variable 3 years before acquisition. The ‘after
acquisition’ regressions include controls for the levels of plant age, size and the
level of the dependent variable at the time of acquisition. We do not control
for size when employment is the dependent variable. All regressions also include
a constant term, year, industry (4-digit ISIC) and year-industry (3-digit ISIC)
interaction dummies. ∗∗, ∗, (∗) indicate significance at 1, 5, 10%.
In order to further investigate the trends around acquisitions, we focus on Sample 3 and
regress the plant level change (growth) in performance on our previous controls (year, industry
and industry-year interaction dummies, age and size) as well as the level of the dependent
variable in the start year for the change. Results from these regressions are presented in Table
4 where we look at the growth over 3 different periods: 1) from 3 years before the acquisition
until 3 years after, 2) from 3 years before the acquisition until the acquisition year, and 3)
from the acquisition year until 3 years after the acquisition. In order not to make this too
year-dependent we use the average of years 2 and 3 before and after acquisition. This shows
us whether plants improve on the level of the 4 performance indicators they had 3 years before
the acquisition or at the time of acquisition.
The growth result in Table 4 shows that plants subject to domestic acquisitions do not
have employment growth significantly different from the reference group over the 7 year period
17
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from 3 years before until 3 years after the acquisition. Splitting this into the period before and
after acquisition shows that plants subject to domestic acquisitions reduce their employment
before the acquisition and increase employment after, resulting in a zero net change over the 7
years relative to average. In contrast, foreign acquisitions have significantly higher employment
growth than the reference group from 3 years before before to 3 years after the acquisition,
and there is no evidence of a significant negative development in employment before foreign
acquisitions. As in Figure 1, Table 4 shows that plants subject to domestic acquisitions see both
their labour productivity and their TFP decline over the 3-year period before the acquisition,
and provides no evidence of a positive development in the period after the acquisition. For
plants subject to foreign acquisitions labour productivity after the acquisition increases, while
there are no significant effects in terms of TFP. Both types of ownership changes in Sample
3 have significantly higher wage growth than the reference group over the acquisition period.
This is due to larger wage growth than average in the period after ownership change.
Figure 2: Employment, wages and productivity around acquisitions by domestic and foreign
multinationals in year t relative to industry-year mean
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Notes: Graphical representation of regression results for Sample 4 in Table 5,
i.e. plants with 1 one acquisition and acquisition by domestic (solid line) and
foreign (dashed line) MNEs. Reference line at zero represents industry-year
mean. Dots indicate significance at 10% or better.
As stated above, Samples 1-3 compare non-MNEs that are acquired by other non-MNEs
to those acquired by foreign MNEs. In the fourth columns of Table 5 in the Appendix the
domestic acquisitions represent instead acquisitions of non-MNEs by domestic MNEs. Due to
the small number of acquisitions these results are mostly not statistically significant, but the
18
SNF Working Paper No 22/09
graphical representation in Figure 2 shows foreign acquisitions and acquisitions by domestic
multinationals to be much more similar than foreign acquisitions and domestic acquisitions by
non-MNEs. This suggests that multinationality versus non-multinationality of the acquirer is
more important in determining the choice of acquisition target than the distinction between
domestic and foreign.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we examine the performance of Norwegian manufacturing plants that are acquired
by a new domestic or a new foreign owner around acquisition. We look at employment, wages
and productivity and show that plants subject to these two types of ownership change differ
both before the acquisition and in their post-acquisition performance. It is not uncommon that
acquisitions occur close to plant entry or exit, or that plants may experience several ownership
changes close in time. We demonstrate how taking account of these possibly confounding events
introduces restrictions on the sample of plants that are subject to acquisitions, and how this
affects our results.
Taken together the evidence presented here suggests that domestic and foreign acquisitions
occur in very different types of plants. Prospective foreign owners select the ‘cherries’ and leave
the ‘lemons’ to new domestic owners. This conclusion is robust to different restrictions on the
sample of acquisition plants. The sample selection required to be able to follow plants from
3 years before to 3 years after acquisition increases the differences in performance between
domestic and foreign acquisition targets by introducing a downward bias for the results on
wages and labour productivity in the case of the domestic acquisitions and an upward bias for
all performance measures in the case of foreign acquisitions.
When domestic plants are acquired by new domestic owners that are not multinationals,
the acquisition is preceded by a period of deteriorating performance in the plants: employment
declines and so does labour productivity. Thus, in line with the arguments of Lichtenberg and
Siegel (1987) these ownership changes seem to follow lapses of inefficiency, which is consistent
with the inefficient management hypothesis. Under the new owner they return to their pre-
acquisition employment levels but remain below their pre-acquisition productivity levels. Thus,
inefficient management does not seem to be replaced by more efficient management, which could
suggest that there is managerial hybris at play in domestic acquisitions.
In contrast to the domestic acquisitions, there is little evidence of performance weakening
before acquisitions in plants targeted by foreign owners. Foreign owners looking for an acquisi-
tion target choose plants that are in a strong position in terms of size and productivity. Thus,
these acquisitions are perhaps less a case of inefficient management, but could be due to syner-
gies. Alternatively, if foreign direct investment is purely about market access or about gaining
access to technology, it pays to acquire large and productive local plants. After acquisition,
employment, wages and labour productivity increase in these plants. This suggests that MNEs
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target plants that complement their own firm-specific assets, and that the benefits of access
to superior shared assets such as group-specific knowledge or management practises are what
makes these plants thrive. This is confirmed by suggestive evidence for acquisitions by domestic
multinationals. Compared to the differences in performance between domestic non-MNE and
foreign acquisitions, the performance in plants acquired by domestic multinationals appears to
be much more similar to that of the foreign acquisitions.
The simultaneous decline in employment and labour productivity in plants subject to do-
mestic acquisitions as well as the simultaneous increase in employment, wages and labour
productivity in plants subject to foreign acquisitions suggests that acquisitions go hand-in-
hand with changes in the composition of the labour force. Evidence for Sweden suggests that
the positive effect of foreign acquisitions on high-skilled employees is more immediate than for
unskilled employees (Bandick and Karpaty, 2007). Our data do not allow us to distinguish
between high-skilled and low-skilled employees, thus we leave this issue to future research.
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A Appendix
Variable definitions
AGEit The age of a plant in year t is counted as the number of years since entry, where the
plant is given the age 1 in the entry year. We calculate the age of a plant by using the
full panel from the manufacturing statistics from 1972 and defining entry and exit as
explained in Section 3.2.
Kit Our estimate of capital stock at the plant level is based on information in the Manufac-
turing Statistics for investment in machinery, transport equipment and buildings. Each
of these three investment series are deflated with separate investment price indeces from
the National Accounts for 17 manufacturing sectors. Deflated investment is accumulated
over time into the capital stock of the plant using the perpetual inventory method. De-
preciation rates for machinery, transport equipment and buildings are taken to be 6%,
15% and 2%, respectively. Starting values for capital stock in the entry year are obtained
by distributing the aggregate capital stock from 62 manufacturing sectors to the plants
based on their share of energy use in the sector. We depreciate the starting value of the
capital stock with 6% per year. In addition, we add information from the Manufacturing
Statistics on the costs of rented machinery and buildings to our capital measure. We
experimented with two other capital stock measures: one where we distributed the ag-
gregate capital stock to the plant level in the entry year using employment shares instead
of energy use shares, and one capital measure purely based on accumulated investment
using the perpetual inventory method without setting a start value in the entry year of
the plant from aggregate capital data. Both capital stock alternatives give more or less
the same TFP results for acquisitions as those reported in the paper.
Lit The number of employees in the plant. Calculated from information on total number of
own employees taken directly from the manufacturing statistics plus a measure for the
number of rented employees. This is calculatedfrom the costs of rented labour assuming
the same average pay for rented labour as for own employees. We have experimented
with replacing the number of employees with the total number of hours worked in the
plant when estimating TFP. Total hours worked in the plant during a year is available
directly from the Manufacturing Statistics. Our TFP results are not sensitive to whether
we define the labour input as number of employees or as total hours worked in the plant.
LPit Labour productivity defined as log(Yit/Lit).
Mit Total real cost of materials used obtained by deflating with input-price deflators available
from Statistics Norway at the sector classification used in the National Accounts. In the
manufacturing statistics, this variable includes rented labour and capital, we subtract
these and allocate them to the labour and capital measures, respectively.
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Wageit Average real wages in the plant. Total wage cost from the Manufacturing Statistics
deflated using the consumer price index from Statistics Norway divided by the number
of employees in the plant.
Yit Real gross production value net of sales taxes and subsidies, obtained by using output de-
flators from Statistics Norway. The aggregation level for the output deflators is according
to the sector classification used in the National Accounts, and lies somewhere in between
the 2- and 3-digit ISIC level.
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